Ethics and Circumstances

I recently read Danny Shahar's summary of Universally Preferred Behaviour: A Rational Proof of Secular Ethics. The summary can be found here. In it, he states that, from the perspective of academic philosophy:

it is emphatically not a formal requirement of a moral theory that it make the same claim about what people should do regardless of the circumstances

I asked (in a comment below that post) if this might not be seen as a failure of the philosophy of ethics. His response leads me to believe that I have misunderstood what he intended with the word "circumstances."

I hope to address that misunderstanding here, and perhaps he will be kind enough to delve deeper, should such delving be necessary, on his blog Back to the Drawing Board.

He first, quite rightly, draws distinctions between murder and killing and theft and taking. The prior two verbs entail an ethical judgment. We can, therefore, say that murder and theft are always wrong. If they were not, they would be killing and taking (respectively). Of course whether or not a death is a murder or a killing (or something else entirely) depends upon the circumstances. This certainly addresses the letter of my question. I concede a sloppy choice of words. We are in agreement that the difference between murder (bad) and killing (indeterminate) is based on circumstances. I believe that S. Molyneux's assessment would be the same.

He then gives another example of circumstances:

For example, take the act of "killing a person." If I'm sitting in a coffee shop, and I see a stranger walk in and order a coffee, it seems like it would be wrong of me to kill her. But if I'm sitting in that same coffee shop, and I see that same stranger walk in, except now she's pointing a gun at me and (seemingly) getting ready to pull the trigger, we might not judge me so harshly if I were to kill her

Again, we are in agreement. There is a material difference between the two circumstances. One that can be described in terms of a configurations of matter (to strip it to its barest components) and conditions which are accessible to observation and reason.

My comment about the (possible) failure of the philosophy of ethics does not stem from a belief that the above examples should be covered by a universal rule that is agnostic of the circumstances.

As an example of the difference between the judgment rendered by a rational, material-oriented ethical framework and those generated by historical ethical systems might be best demonstrated by the following example.

Imagine the coffee shop above. Situation #2 unfolds: a stranger comes in and points a gun at me and is about to pull the trigger (seemingly) and I incapacitate the stranger in some way.

Now imagine a parallel scenario identical in every detail, except that the stranger is carrying an FBI badge.

Do these differing circumstances change the "rightness" of my actions? Physically, there is no difference is circumstances (other than the shield of metal in the attackers coat pocket). Many ethical frameworks, of course, rely on abstract and slippery concepts: authority, legitimacy, jurisdiction, etc. and judge the attacked to have acted in an unethical manner. This is the sense in which I think traditional philosophy has failed with regards to ethics.

I'm curious how academic philosophy would respond to the claim that circumstances matter, but only circumstances that are manifest in physical reality (that may be too strong a restriction, we'll see).

And to follow up on one other point in my comment to Danny's post: is it not reasonable to begin with a system isomorphic to the scientific method? I find it appealing on every level (I know that's not relevant to its validity). The amount of human suffering that is let pass by ethical systems which weigh intangible concepts (usually concepts that favor the powerful and the aggressive) is staggering. Is it only coincidental that an ethical framework grounded in reason and evidence favors instead voluntary relationships and non-aggression? Is it coincidental that civil society, as a matter of course, follows the single maxim of a framework so grounded? Is it coincidence that the only violators are those that interact with strangers by killing or threatening to imprison/kill them?

Again, I know that the validity of the statement isn't determined by the appeal of the outcome. I am wondering if it is possible that a UPB style framework could be workable vis á vis the perspective of academic philosopy, and if so, under what circumstances.